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Violence and the Plague in Arag6n, 1348-1351
by
Melanie V. Shirk
Univer ity of New Mexico, Los Alamos

As Philip Ziegler has noted, "Statistic alone cannot provide an adequate
picture of the Black Death." ' To say that one-quarter or one-third or one-half
of Europe's population perished within a few years gains the reader's attention, but does not convey what such a brutal calamity meant to the average
person at the time. The fourteenth century suffered many calamities, but the
sudden and mysteriou appearance of the Black Death, with no known cau e
or cure, must surely have been the most terrifying.
In a previous article, l discus ed the economic and administrative upheavals caused by the 1348 epidemic.' Using the same documents concerning the
realm of Arag6n, I wish to how some of the violence and social dislocation
suffered by those caught up in the disaster. The illustrations are drawn from a
collection of 157 documents published in 1956 by Amada L6pez de Menesis.i
They span the years 1348-1384, although all but 27 are dated between 13481351. All were issued by Pedro IV of Arag6n (1336-1387) in response to
various petitions or emergencies evoked by the plague. We can thus gain an
idea not only of how the Black Death touched the lives of Aragon's inhabitants, but also how the king tried to deal with and mitigate the violence and
lawlessness which followed in the wake of the epidemic.
The Corona de Arag6n in the mid-fourteenth cemury was composed of
mainland Catalonia, Valencia, and Arag6n plus the island realms of Sardinia
and the Balearics. earby Sicily eem to have served as the "carrier" which
introduced the epidemic to Arag6n and the re t of Europe.• In Arag6n the epidemic was at its most virulent in the spring and summer of 1348; it lay dormant
through the winter and reappeared briefly in spring, 1349.'
Bubonic plague was only one of the evil suffered by Arag6n at this time.
Civil war between the king and disaffected nobles lasted from 1347 to 1349; a
revolt in Sardinia occurred in 1348; and MalJorca endured a short-lived invasion in 1349. Adding to the peoples' woes were a series of bad harvests. There
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were already man-made mi erie and famine in this realm when the latest and
most devastating blow feU .
Pedro IV of Aragon was an intelligent and pragmatic monarch facing
political, economic, and social turmoil. He tried to deal with the treatable
after-effects of the epidemic rather than spend futile efforts to prevent the
inevitable. For instance, in July, 1348, he issued an order to authorities in
Teruel to screen carefully all those claiming to be doctors or surgeons. Fraudulent medical practitioners were causing further injuries and deaths, so that any
found by officials were to be thrown out of Teruel or denied entry Lo it.• Of
course, it could be argued that treatment by a genuine or fake medieval doctor
might look much the same, but at least the king was re olved to tackle the
problems from what he perceived to be a praclical basis. Any atlempts to stem
the epidemic were left to local officials; the king simply tried Lo move ahead of
or away from it. The plague did not prevent Pedro from successfully carrying
out his own political-military plans, but the extreme mortality caused by the
Black Death forced him to rely on an ever-narrowing pool of local and royal
officials. Replacement of the e officials posed great difficulties for the king and
enabled lawbreakers to operate with more and more impunity.
The first examples are of what might be termed non-violent crime, usually
involving fraud or attempts to use the confusion and lack of officials to bend
the law to a particular advantage. This was especially true when an inheritance
was at stake and rightful heirs had themselves perished or the deceased had not
had lhe time or an available official to leave a will. The great mortality among
notaries made wills more scarce as the weeks went on, so that loopholes for
false claimants became correspondingly larger.
In Huesca the bailiff was ordered to settle the quabbling of three heirs over
a legacy because the deceased had left no will, 7 a situation that wa only too
familiar to over-worked officials. Before the plague, a merchant of Barcelona,
Jaime de Rocafort, had supplied a fellow merchant with various goods. The
debtor, who kept putling off payment, died during the plague, along with his
wife and mother. His heirs likewise dragged their feet on payment of the debt.
In 1354 the long-suffering lender finally sued, and the king ordered a magistrate in Zaragoza to arbitrate and see that the debt was paid.• o doubt the
debtors hoped that the confusion caused by the epidemic would allow their
loan to fall through the bureaucratic cracks, something which must have often
occurred. If the lender himself bad died in the Black Death, the debt could
have likewise gone unpaid. Many debts must have been "liquidated" in either
or both ways.
Five other towns with a serious shortage of officials reported that many
people were illegally occupying the homes of plague victims by claiming to be
the heirs. The lack of wills and deaths of some of the rightful inheritors made
such claims impossible to disprove, so in June, 1349, the king simply ordered
that settlements were to be made with the "squatters. "9 This made the new
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residents legal and taxpaying and a boon to the Crown. A wrangle had occurred over the ownership of a house in RoseU6n before the Black Death. One
claimant fled town during the epidemic, but tbe other stuck it out in the disputed building, evidently hoping to trengthen his claim. In 1350 the district
magistrate was ordered to confiscate the house and finally settle the quarrel. 10
In the districts of RoseU6n and Cerdaigne, many goods belonging to "certain minor and other who had fled" during the plague were stolen. Four
years later (1352), the king appointed two lawyers 10 inve ligate the case and
ee that the stolen goods were returned to their rightful owner . 11 Not only
must it have been difficult to gather information so long after the crime, it is
likely that some of the victims died or had left the area, making justice almo t
impossible.
A similar hiatus occurred in Calamocha. This unfortunate village had been
left so depopulated after the plague that only four dwellings were being occupied. Tbe neighboring settlement of Gascony took the opportunity in 1349
to confiscate Calamocha's woods and pastureland. In 1352 one of Calamocha's
inhabitants was empowered by the king to open legal proceedings and levy
penalties again t Gascony. 12
Eight years after the epidemic, a property theft in Borja came to the king's
notice. A vineyard belonging to Moslcms who had died from plague was taken
over by some Franciscan "without legal license and with no legitimate cau e"
and then sold to Christians. At the request of the Islamic community of the
town, Pedro ordered the bailiff general of Arag6n to ettle the case.' l
The seven examples show not only the confusion caused by the Black
Death, but the serious time lags which such disruption caused in the settling of
dispute begun before and during the epidemic. That of Borja, for instance,
took eight years to come to the king's notice. How many more unpaid debts,
lost inheritances, and frauds must have occurred without coming to light at all.
There is another case in these documents of theft committed by one of the
king's own officials, a sub-magistrate in Monistol. He not only unjustly imprisoned a French pilgrim returning from Monserrat, but kept the man's jewels,
gold, and silver. EventuaUy tbe Frenchman was released, and after returning
home, sent a petition to the king. In 1351 Pedro ordered the magistrate of
Manresa to investigate and not only sec that this victim's valuables were
returned, but to find out if this official had committed other such crimes.,.
This incident would certainly not have been an i olated one; the many mortalities, loss and discontinuity of records, and slow reaction of the central authorities made it easy for officials themselves to steal, especially when there was
such a good chance that the victims of their crimes would themselves die of
plague. This Frenchman was lucky enough to survive and reach the ear of the

king.
ot all deception were sinister. Three craftsmen from a monastery in
Vernet used tbe plague as a means of escaping the jurisdiction of their old
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overlord and ettled in the town of Villafranca de Confleot. The abbot complained to the king in 1351, but Pedro ordered a magistrate to defend the men's
right to stay in their new location.'' He also advised the official to warn the
three men that they could not be defended if they moved from Villafranca to a
third location, the plague evidently providing one of the few legitimate excuses
for their action.
None of the above documents describe destruction or physical harm, but
the next illustrations provide an escalation in the levels of crime. As Gabriel
Jackson has noted, "The sheer massiveness of such mortality entailed a complete breakdown of established authority. Robbery and hysteria became
normal occurrence . . . ""
The empty homes of those who had fled the Black Death or become its victims proved easy and irresistible targets for thieves. Already in June, 1348, a
member of the royal hou ehold reported that after his wife and parents died of
plague in Barcelona "their movable goods were left without protection and, no
one knowing to whom they belonged, the valuables were carried off by people
unknown ."" The city magistrate was ordered to recover what he could,
although chances of success were slim, despite the unusual speed with which
this petition was answered.
Another royal retainer and his niece had fled Valencia during the height of
the epidemic and returned to find the rest of their family dead and the home
looted and derelict. 11 A citizen of Puigcerda had been in another town when
the Black Death struck their area. He returned to his town to find his wife dead
and their home ransacked. In this case, the man pointed to his stepson a one
of the looters.' ' In Vizcarra those who had looted the home of Pedro Garces'
deceased father and sister brazenly claimed to be relations of the victims and
refused 10 return goods which they claimed were rightfully theirs. 20 When the
mistress of a large manorhouse in Villafranca del Panad~ died from plague,
her terrified servants fled. The heir to the estate was him elf ill with plague in
Manresa and hired local men to guard the dwelling. De pile, or perhaps
because of, this, the home was robbed. 2 1
In all of these cases, the king ordered officials to investigate, find the guilty
parties, and return stolen goods. But such orders were issued one to two years
after the crimes had been committed, amid a critical hortage of officials and a
still-disrupted administrative and legal system. The chances of success must
have been slim to none. Such crimes were doubtless common, particularly
when the criminals had little or no fear of retribution.
In one place mentioned in the documents, violence went far beyond looting. A petition from the citizens of Prades described how "at the time of the
plague, in this town and the surrounding area, many robberies, homicides, and
other crimes and injuries were committed" with no fear of capture or punishment. All of Prades' officials had fallen victim to the epidemic, leading to a
complete breakdown of law and order amid the hysteria caused by the Black
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Death itself. With no surviving authorities and terrified at the lawlessness, "the
inhabitants themselves, upper and lower class alike, were moving out of their
homes to other locations."n The scope of this anarchy is more clearly seen
when the date of the petition is considered: ovember 16, 1353.
In ovember, the king appointed a royal official to aid Prades' new bailiff
and sub-magistrate in seeking out and punishing the guilty and to try and stop
the population drain. Here, indeed, is the "complete breakdown of established
authority" of which Jackson spoke, and it lasted well beyond the plague year
of 1348. There is no mention of other Prades in these documents, but it is not
unreasonable to assume that such lawlessness did occur elsewhere, in towns
where the remaining population might simply abandon this kind of area or
themselves succumb to either plague or homicide.
The hy teria noted by Jackson and others led to a more ominous development in Arag6n, as it did in other plague-stricken areas: the effort by many to
seek a scapegoat on which to blame the disaster. Reactions were varied at first.
The mass of people did not need a learned treatise to tell them that the plague
was somehow spread by contagion, although no one knew why or by what
means. Many reacted, as we have seen, by fleeing their own viUages and towns
to try and escape the epidemic; while others indulged in excesses of religious
fervor. Solemn processions were held in every community, and wills were
changed leaving pos essions to the Church. 1t didn't take long, however,
before people realized that neither priests, doctors, officials, or cholars could
stop the disea e. In their desperation, mobs fell easy prey to those who suggested that the Black Death was being deliberately induced by evil men, usually
through poison dumped into wells and water supplies.
A Spanish physician, Alfonso of Cordoba, was one who gave respectability
to such an idea in a medical tract which speaks more highly for his imagination
than hfa learning. He admitted that, while the epidemic's initial cause had been
astrological and, thus, unavoidable, it should have ceased within a year and
was being "unnaturally prolonged" by men of malice. Worse, this inequity was
especially directed toward Christians. n
These documents illustrate some of the results of such paranoia. Among
the various groups accused of poisoning were pilgrims. In their travels from
shrine to shrine, they were in the dangerous position of being conspicuous outsiders and prime suspects of "spreading" the plague. In June, 1348, a royal
official had to reque t a safeconduct from the king on behalf of a Portuguese
pilgrim and his companion, who were en route to the shrine of St. Francis of
Assisi when the epidemic hit Arag6n . "Because of widespread rumors that the
water is being poisoned by such as they, they cannot continue their trip without danger to them elves" 2 ' and had prudently decided to return immediately
to Portugal. In October, the king was also ordering that the Moslem community of Huesca be guarded against possible auack.H Neither pilgrims nor
Moslem seem to have been objects of actual violence, however, possibly
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because they were soon overshadowed by a much more prominent target:
the Jews.
At the time of the Black Death, accu at ions again t the Jews for spreading
the plague covered a wide area of Europe. Religion and wealth had always
made them a tempting target and their separate living quarters and reclusiveness attracted renewed suspicion as paranoia and panic increased. This was not
the first time Jews had been accu ed of plotting to poison Christians, but previous charges had been local. 26 As theories grew more elaborate, the entire
"plot" was believed to have sprung from the black arts of the Jewish community in Toledo." ot everyone believed this absurd story, but protests and
even official actions, such as taken in Arag6n, proved of little avail in stemming either the stories or the reactions they provoked.
Arag6n had a highly visible Jewish population prominent in government
and finance. The kings of Arag6n traditionally favored and protected the Jews
of their realm, using them as servants of the Crown and impo ing enough
financial obligations on them to ensure the king a steady income. 21 They were
in the unenviable position of being the "King's people." Such prominence was
a dangerous thing in the best of times; now it would prove fatal to some. Ironically it only added to their woes that Pedro IV was one of the most liberal
Aragonese kings in his attitude toward the Jews. He genuinely appreciated
Jewish intellectual ability and had in his service Jewi h doctors, translators,
astrologers, astronomers, and cartographers. 29 He was also unusually lenient
in the religious freedom he allowed. 10 During the king's attempts to keep ahead
of the epidemic, one of the people he con ulted was a Jew of Huesca named
Jucef, whom Pedro requested to search his district and find a place free from
plague where the king could spend a few days. 1 1 Obviously the king of Arag6n
took no notice of the stories of plague-spreading by the Jews. Unhappily, others
did, if only to have a good excu e to attack wealthy and conspicuous nonChristians who seemed to have a special relationship with the ruling class.
In 1348 there were successive attacks on the Jewish communities in Barcelona, Cervera, and Tarrega, the kind of chain reaction which the king had
wanted to avoid. ln every case, Jews were killed, their homes looted, and their
loan records destroyed, defaced or stolen. Other studie describe these attacks
in detail, 32 but several of the documents in this collection supplement what is
already known.
Violence against the Jews first occurred in Barcelona, soon after the first
incidents of plague. As in other towns, religious procession had been held to
try and tum aside the wrath of God; H their failure only increased the peoples'
frustration and anger. On May 17 the funeral of a plague victim was held in
the plaza of St. James, which bordered the Jewish ghetto. When someone at
the service made a disparaging reference 10 the Jews, angry members of the
funeral party, joined by passers-by and street rabble, broke into the ghetto.
Some assaulted their victims with swords and "many Jews perished.""
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Royal reaction was swift and furious. Only five days after the attack, the
king ordered local officials to "diligently and carefully make inquiries into the
charges and find those guilty . .. " » and Lo guard the ghetto against further
attack . On May 29 royal officials in five towns, all near Barcelona and all with
considerable Jewish communities (including Cervera and Tarrega), were
warned to "protect and defend" the ghettos "courageously and strongly. " 16
But , as we have seen, the king's orders and good intentions were to no avail.
The casualtie in Tarrega were particularly high because the town bailiff blatantly disobeyed royal orders to protect the Jews and actually egged on the
rioters. The result was several hundred Jews killed.l'
The king was equally stymied in efforts to puni h the guilty; his desire for
justice was not shared by the Christians in the towns involved. An unedifying
spectacle occurred in Tarrega when the king's prosecutor opened hearings to
try and uncover the rioters. The citizens began to accuse, denounce, charge,
and counter-charge one another before the royal official. Verbal violence soon
gave way to physical, and by October, 1348, "armed bands had formed, brawls
were taking place, hatred and malice were everywhere."ll By simply dragging
their feet, local officials mounted an effective campaign against royal intentions. One suspect in the Barcelona attack finally came to trial, but not until
1351 and only by order of the king. n In Cervera, the king again had to appoint
his own official to try one group of accu ed rioters in June, 1351.' 0
II is doubtful if the guilty suffered any real punishment for what was committed in 1348. The king did exact revenge of a sort by making determined and
successful efforts to re tore the devastated communities to a healthy economic
state. This often meant siding with Jews against their Chri tian debtors or
taxing Christian communities."
The actual number of these documents dealing with crime and violence is
relatively small, but they run the gamut from fraud to looting to murder and
mob violence and illustrate the many reactions provoked by the Black Death.
Gabriel Jackson has estimated that it required a minimum of two years to
re-establish police, court, and notarial ervices." We have seen that the social
disruption could last much longer, the example of Prades being a dramatic
case in point. Certainly, as Carolly Erickson has stated," .. . medieval people
tolerated a degree of anarchy, violence, and loss of life that is difficult for us
to comprehend."'' The crimes noted here were nothing extraordinary; theft,
fraud, murder, and the like were pre ent before and after the epidemic and
attacks on outsiders like the Jews were nothing new. But the Black Death was a
"catalytic element of the first order"" and the number and intensity of such
violence was raised to an unprecedented height.
De pite his earnest efforts, the king of Arag6n could deal with only a fraction of the wrongdoings committed during the plague because of the dreadful
mortality among royal and local officials. The increasingly slow reaction of
authorities coupled with a corresponding escalation in lawlessness must have
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dramatically increased that "underlying climate of in ecurity" which was so
much a part of medieval life. 45
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